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CASE COMMENTS
SECURITY CLEARANCE REVOCATION AS A
JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY
Whether the withdrawal of a security clearance' from a govern-
ment contract employee2 presents a justiciable case or controversy is
an issue which affects the status of nearly three million individuals
in private employment.3 This vital problem has been raised in Greene
v. McElroy.4 The appellant in this case also asserts the invalidity of
the entire Industrial Personnel Security Program 5 and challenges the
constitutionality of the procedures of the program.6
William L. Greene was, by profession, a trained and experienced
aeronautical engineer. He was employed at Engineering and Re-
search Corporation (ERCO), a manufacturing company located in
Maryland, from 1937 until his dismissal in 1953. ERCO was engaged
132 C.F.R. § 67.1-2(c) (Supp. 1958). "The term 'clearance' means an adminis-
trative determination, in accordance with approved policy, that a contractor or
contractor employee is eligible to have access to classified information .... A clear-
ance is an administrative determination that the granting of such approval is
clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.... In the case of a
contractor employee, a clearance is an approval for the employee to have access to
specified categories of classified information necessary for the performance of his
work with a particular contractor on contracts with a military department or activity
thereof which involve access to such information."
21d. § 67.--2(b). "The term 'contractor employee' means any United States citizen
or immigrant alien who is an official or employee of a contractor .... "
3Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Report of the Special Committee
on The Federal Loyalty-Security Program 64 (1956); Hearings Before the Subcom-
mittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Hennings
Subcommittee), 84 Cong., 2d Sess. 6o6 (1955).
'254 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 872, (1958). See also
Taylor v. McElroy, cert. granted, 358 U.S. 918 (1958) (No. 5o4), which involves similar
facts and issues and questions of mootness and the constitutionality of the procedures
of the industrial security program. The Taylor and Greene cases were argued con-
secutively in the Supreme Court of the United States on April 1-2, 1959. 27 U.S.L.
Week 3275 (U.S. April 7, 1959).
'254 F.2d at 95o . See also 27 U.S.L. Week 3132 (U.S. Oct. 28, 1958). The pro-
gram as it is presently constituted is set forth in Department of Defense Directive
522o0.6 (Feb. 2, 1955), 32 C.F.R. § 67 (Supp. 1958). This article will not discuss the
statutory basis for the program. The Court of Appeals reached the conclusion that
there was sufficient authority for the program. For discussion of this phase of the
case see 254 F.2d at 948-50. A comprehensive description of the program's operation
may be found in Note, 8 Stan. L. Rev. 234 (1956).
0254 F.2d at 95o. See also 27 U.S.L. Week 3132 (U.S. Oct. 28, 1958). Again, this
question is not within the scope of this article. Primary emphasis was placed on this
issue in the arguments before the Supreme Court. 27 U.S.L. Week 3275 (U.S. April
7, 1959). The Court of Appeals held that Greene was not entitled to confrontation
by his accusers and to other procedural protections as a matter of due process of law.
254 F.2d at 950.
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in classified research under contracts with the Department of the Navy.
These contracts incorporated by reference the Department of Defense
Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified Matter.1 At
the time of his dismissal Greene was Vice-President in charge of En-
gineering and General Manager of ERCO at an annual salary of
$i8,ooo plus bonuses. He had government security clearances for
access to confidential, secret, and top secret information of various
governmental agencies, including the Navy Department.8
On April 17, 1953, the Secretary of the Navy informed ERCO's
president that Greene's " 'continued access to Navy classified security
information [was] inconsistent with the best interests of National se-
curity'-9 and requested that he be excluded from classified Navy
projects at ERCO and that he be barred from access to all Navy classi-
fied security information. ERCO proceeded to dismiss Greene from his
job, although his position was held open for him pending review. On
May 28, 1954, he was finally advised that his clearance was denied.
Since the original order withdrawing clearance, Greene has worked
as an architectural draftsman at a salary of $4,400 per year.0
In August 1954, after exhausting the administrative remedies, this
suit was filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia, but
before it came to trial, a new program regulating security clearances
was promulgated. Greene's case was re-examined under these new
regulations, but again, on March 12, 1956, the prior decision was
affirmed.:1
The appellant sought declaratory and injunctive relief by way of a
judgment (i) declaring invalid the act of the Government in with-
drawing his security clearance, and (2) ordering the Government to
restore his security clearance.'
2
The district court found that there was no justiciable controversy,
reasoning that when Greene's employer entered into the government
contract, it was obligated to perform the terms of the contract, even
though it might result in injury to an employee.'3 Moreover, the court
72 Gov't Sec. & Loy. Rep. 25:95 (Feb. 1957). This is the current edition of the
Manual which was first issued in January 1951, and revised in May 1953.
"254 F.2d at 946.
OId. at 946.
'OId. at 946, 952.
uId. at 947.
"Ibid.
"Greene v. Wilson, i5o F. Supp. 958, 959-6o (D.D.C. 1957), aff'd, 254 F.ad 944
(D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 872 (1958). "It is fundamental when one
presumes to accept a contractual offer then that offer must be accepted in terms,
and one of the terms here, as has been said, related to security controls. The neces-
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implied that ERCO was free not to enter into such a contract, that
it entered into said contract voluntarily, and that Greene had the
same freedom with regard to his employment at ERCO. The injury
to Greene, the court stated, was not the fault of the Government
since it was only acting properly to protect its own existence.
14
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit recognized that the appellant had suffered tangible injury in
certain respects, but held that the mere recitation of injury without
more did not present a justiciable controversy. 15 It said there must
also be a conflict which the courts can effectively decide and adminis-
ter.', The court noted that it would not inquire into the merits of
the dismissal except to see if the Government had complied with the
applicable statutes and regulations, said statutory compliance being
conceded in this case.17 Such judgments, it pointed out, must be made
with regard to policy considerations which are appropriate only to
the Executive Department.' s
A justiciable case or controversy exists when adverse litigants 9
with substantial interests20 have presented a real issue for determina-
tion.2 1 An examination of the facts of this case shows that Greene is
not a litigant with substantial interests.
22
sity for such is obvious. If the plaintiff's employer did not see fit to accept and con-
form, it had perfect freedom not to enter into the contract. On acceptance of the
offer in terms, it was obliged in the circumstances to carry out its essentials, the
presumed result of which was the loss by the plaintiff of his position. But this can-
not be said in any degree to be the fault of the Government, for here, through
properly constituted authority, it was exercising its right to protect itself against
threats to its survival, and as far as the action of an individual was concerned, this
action taken, even envisioning the result to the plaintiff, fails to set forth any invasion
of his legal rights and therefore, as has been said, there is no justiciable contro-
versy...."
"Ibid.
254 F.2d at 953.
"Ibid. "There must be a 'justicible' controversy-one which the courts can finally
and effectively decide, under tests and standards which they can soundly administer
within their special field of competence."
'lIbid.
131d. at 953-54. "Indeed, any meaningful judgment in such matters must rest on
considerations of policy, and decisions as to comparative risks, appropriate only to
the executive branch of the Government .... In a mature democracy, choices such
as this must be made by the executive branch, and not by the judicial."
"U.S. Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, The Constitution of
the United States of America Annotated 539-40 & n.a (Corwin ed. 1953).
20Id. at 542 & nna, 2, 3, & 4. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,
337 US. 682, 693 (1949).
"U.S. Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, The Constitution of
the United States of America Annotated 544-45 (Corwin ed. 1953).
"The Court of Appeals also apparently thought that no 'real issue' was presented
19591
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An attack upon the constitutionality of an act of a government
department can only be made by a person who has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of that
action.23 This interest is known technically as standing to sue.24 This
requirement is enforced in declaratory-judgment type relief cases as
well as in cases seeking the more traditional types of relief.25
The question then resolves itself into one of whether or not Greene
has been legally injured by the action of the Government in removing
his security clearance. It is not enough that a person be seriously
harmed in order to claim constitutional protection. He must also
have been deprived of some liberty or property which the judiciary
traditionally protects under the due process clause of the Constitu-
tion. This distinction is important in that it serves as the dividing
line between those interests which are judicially protected against
governmental interference and those upon which reliance must be
placed on other branches of government.
Those interests which are said to be affected by the removal of a
security clearance are "the economic interest in employment and the
relational interest of reputation. '26 The Court of Appeals recognized,
2 7
and the Government has conceded,28 that Greene was injured in cer-
tain ways, one of which was the loss of his employment. But these
interests, the court said, are not of the type that have traditionally
by these facts upon which the courts could make an effective determination. 254
F.2d at 953-54. This problem, which also concerns the right of judicial review on
these facts, will not be discussed herein.
211 Am. Jur. Constitutional Law § 111 (1938, Supp. 1958). "One threatened with
injury by an act of an agent of the government done under statutory authority can
challenge the validity of the statute in a suit against the agent, only where the right
invaded is a legal right, one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected
against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege.
Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 3o6 U.S. 118, 83 L.ed.
543, 59 S. Ct. 366." See also 28 Am. Jur. Injunctions § 182 (1940). Cf. the language
of Mr. Justice Brandeis, concurring in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
297 U.S. 288, 347-48 (1936), in which he sets out his seven rules for avoiding con-
stitutional issues: "The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon com-
plaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation.... Among the
many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right
of challenge to one who lacks a personal property right."
21Comment, lo Stan. L. Rev. 335, 336 (1958)-
2U.S. Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, The Constitution of
the United States of America Annotated 552-53 (Corwin ed. 1953).
"Comment, so Stan. L. Rev. 335, 337 (1958). See also Note, 19 Mont. L. Rev. 121,
124 (1958), for an excellent discussion of these two interests.
"254 F.2d at 952.
2'Brief for Respondents p. 3o, Greene v. McElroy (No. s8o, 1958 Term, in the
Supreme Court of the United States on Writ of Certiorari).
[Vol. XVI
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been accorded judicial protection. In other words, these interests are
not liberty or property within the traditional concept of due process.
Three lines of cases have been utilized to support the view that
courts do protect a person's economic interest in employment. Firstly,
it is said that the courts will protect the right to work in the common
occupations of the community.29 Certainly, the occupation here is not
a common one; on the contrary, it is a highly sensitive position open
only to those skilled in their profession and of unquestioned loyalty
and reliability. Secondly, it is clear that a person has a right to be
protected from arbitrary and discriminatory exclusion from public
employment. 3o Aside from the fact that public employment is not in-
volved in the principal case, it should be pointed out that Greene
was not excluded from employment by the action of the Government
in removing his security clearance. 31 Moreover, the words "arbitrary"
and "discriminatory" as utilized by the Supreme Court in this con-
text mean only that the Industrial Personnel Security Program, as a
whole, must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate government
objective. The security program, as presently constituted, does bear
this rational relationship to a legitimate government objective-the
requirements of national security and the protection of classified se-
curity information. Finally, it is said that a private person has a right
to engage in his chosen profession and not to be barred from it through
the imposition of a legal disability.32 Here again, the action taken
against Greene has not resulted in total exclusion from his profes-
sion.33 However, the withdrawal of a security clearance may operate as
z Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
'Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 556 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff,
34.1 U.S. 183, 192 (1952); United Pub. Workers of America, CIO v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75, 100 (1947).
11254 F.2d at 946 n.2. "Since a clearance relates only to access to classified defense
information, the denial or revocation of a clearance to a contractor or contractor
employee does not preclude his participation in unclassified work." 32 C.F.R. §
67-1-3(b) (Supp. 1958). "An employee who is denied clearance is thereby denied access
to classified information, but he need not be discharged if employment not requiring
this access is available for him." Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
Report of the Special Committee on The Federal Loyalty-Security Program 64
(1956). "Denial or revocation of clearance for access to classified material does not
require that an employee be discharged.... Clearances under the industrial security
program are not for employment; they are merely for access to classified material."
Report of the U.S. Commission on Government Security 257-6o (1957).
'1Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 262 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar Ex-
aminers, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889); Ex
parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 379 (1866); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 277, 320 (1866); Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 1955).
"254 F. 2d at 95o; Webb v. United States, 21 F.R.D. 251, 258 (1957); 46 Calif.
L. Rev. 828, 829 (1958). Cf. Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708, 711-18 (gth Cir. 1955).
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a legal bar to Greene's employment in the aircraft industry, as it seems
to have done here. But the Supreme Court has stated "that neither
damage nor loss of income in consequence of the action of Govern-
ment, which is not an invasion of recognized legal rights, is in itself
a source of legal rights in the absence of constitutional legislation
recognizing it as such."3 4 This statement illustrates the primary dis-
tinction between action by the Government in its proprietaiy capacity.
and its action in a regulatoiy capacity. It demonstrates that persons
dealing with the Government in its proprietary capacity do not acquire
any interest entitled to judicial protection.
Courts generally will refuse "to protect interests which are con-
sidered to be privileges granted at the grace of the government." 35
This privilege-right dichotomy has been utilized to defeat justicia-
bility in suits by government employees discharged for security rea-
sons since government employment has long been considered a privi-
lege rather than a right.36 It appears that the granting of a govern-
ment secuity clearance is even more of a privilege than the granting
of employment. The access to confidential information, of necessity,
cannot be more than a permissive privilege granted to individuals at
the government's discretion.37
Moreover, the rights of government contract employees should be
assimilated to those accorded government employees. The reason for
this assimilation of the rights of these individuals to those of a gov-
ernment employee is basically that the national interests are the same
in the situation in which government work is contracted out to pri-
vate industry as it is when the Government itself is the employer. In
these cases, the government's interest is in protecting the national
security, and it is to be protected whether the employer is the Gov-
ernment itself or a private corporation under government contract.38
3Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 31o U.S. 113, 125 (1940). Mr. Justice Black who
wrote the opinion in the Lukens case may have thrown some doubt on the use of this
language in this context in the recent arguments before the Supreme Court in the
Greene case. 27 U.S.L. Week 3275, 3279 (U.S. April 7, 1959). Moreover, Assistant At-
torney General George Cochran Doub, counsel for the Government in the Greene case,
admitted to the Supreme Court that the denial of access to Greene did deprive him
of his job. 27 U.S.L. Week 3275, 3279 (U.S. April 7, 1959)-
332 Tul. L. Rev. 313, 314 (1958).
6Dressler v. Wilson, 155 F. Supp. 373 (D.D.C. 1957); McAuliffe v. City of New
Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892); 32 Tul. L. Rev. 313, 314 (1958).
37The basis for granting access is spelled out in 32 C.F.R. § 67.3-1 (Supp. 1958).
"Clearance shall be denied or revoked if it is determined, on the basis of all the
available information, that access to classified information by the person concerned
is not clearly consistent with the interest of national security."
'8254 F.2d at 951; 27 U.S.L. Week 3275, 3279 (U.S. April 7, 1959); Brief for
[Vol. XVI
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If the economic interest discussed above is not entitled to consti-
tutional protection, then it is equally true that any relational interest
of reputation is not entitled to independent constitutional protection.
For the reasons previously stated, reference should be made again to
dismissals from government employment on security grounds. In Bailey
v. Richardson,39 a government employee was dismissed on suspicion of
disloyalty, and it was urged that the resulting stigma impaired op-
portunities for future employment. Judge Prettyman, speaking for
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, nevertheless held that the employee had no redress against the
Government on this basis.
40
The finding here is only a characterization of doubt about the em-
ployee's reliability and is not an affirmative finding of disloyalty or of
any other crime.41 In this sense, the findings are different from those
involved in Harmon v. Brucke 4 2 and Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath.43 In the former, the appellant was discharged
from the Army without an honorable discharge, a finding which
amounted to an official statement as to his Army record.4 4 In the latter
case, the adverse finding would place the appellant organization on
the Attorney General's list of subversive organizations.45
Respondents, p. 43, Greene v. McElroy (No. i8o, 1958 Term, in the Supreme Court
of the United States on Writ of Certiorari).
wi8ae F.-d 46 (D.C. Cir. 195o), aff'd by an equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918
(1951).
'OId. at 63-64. "But if no constitutional right of the individual is being im-
pinged and officials are acting within the scope of official authority, the fact that the
individual concerned is injured in the process neither invalidates the official act
nor gives the individual a right to redress .... These harsh rules, which run counter
to every known precept of fairness to the private individual, have always been held
necessary as a matter of public policy, public interest, and the unimpeded per-
formance of the public business."
"32 C.F.R. § 67.1-3(b) (Supp. 1958). "The denial or revocation of a clear-
ance in and of itself does not necessarily carry any implication that the individual
is disloyal to the United States."
355 U.S. 579 (1958)-
'341 U.S. 123 (1951).
"Case citation note 42 supra. This was an action to require the Army to issue
an honorable discharge rather than a less-than-honorable one under the applicable
statutes and regulations, said certificate being evidence of his character of service
when the discharge was wholly unrelated to the character of service but instead
was based on preservice activities. For other distinguishing factors, see 254 F.2d at
951 n.12.
,'Case citation note 43 supra. This suit was to enjoin the continued listing of
the complaining organization on the Attorney General's list of subversive organiza-
tions. Groups listed were subject to stringent regulations and prohibitions. For
example, the list was utilized in denying passport applications to individual mem-
bers of a listed organization.
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In any event, a program of such magnitude and importance as the
Industrial Personnel Security Program should not be ruled invalid
because of this relational interest to reputation. If such an injury
does in fact result, then the individual should be required to pursue
some other more traditional civil remedy. As the Court of Appeals
pointed out, no court should compel the Government to choose be-
tween the alternatives or disclosing state secrets to persons of doubtful
reliability or of cancelling all of its contracts with ERCO on the
basis that one man's reputation has been damaged.
4 6
Admittedly, there are certain injustices in the present security pro-
gram, but an adverse result in this case would overthrow a carefully
organized security program and would open the files of America's
defense secrets to those of doubtful reliability and trustworthiness.
This is not to suggest that the theory of justiciability in these cases
should be based upon that all-encompassing concept of "public policy."
It is a suggestion that the grave nature of the issues involved and the
legitimate objectives of the program should be weighed in the deter-
mination.
47
Efforts are constantly being made to improve the program.
4 8 If
these suggested improvements are made, many of the program's appar-
ent inequities will tend to disappear. Until that day of perfection is
reached, however, the Government should not be forced to choose be-
tween the drastic alternatives referred to, simply in the name of in-
dividual protection when it is rather clear that the courts will not al-
ways protect such individuals.
ADDENDUM
On June 29, 1959, the Supreme Court of the United States handed
down its long-awaited decision in the Greene case.1 By an 8-1 vote,
4254 F.2d at 951.
'7 Cf. Von Knorr v. Miles, 6o F. Supp. 962 (D.C. Mass. 1945), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Von Knorr v. Griswold, 156 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1946). "Two interests
are in competition and must be considered: the government's concern to prevent
both sabotage and disclosure to the enemy of secret processes, statistics and infor-
mation; and the private individual's concern to go where he pleases and engage in
such work as is offered him." 6o F. Supp. at 97o.
"See, e.g., U. S. Dep't of Air Force, Industrial Personnel Security Review Pro-
gram, First Annual Report 11-12 (1956); Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, Report of the Special Committee on The Federal Loyalty-Security Pro-
gram 137-88 (1956); Report of the U.S. Commission on Government Security 266-319
('957)-
'Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
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the Court held that "in absence of explicit authorization from
either the President or Congress the respondents [Secretary of De-
fense, etc.] were not empowered to deprive petitioner [Greene] of his
job in a proceeding in which he was not afforded the safeguards of
confrontation and cross-examination."
2
Thus, the Court based the decision on the issue of the executive or
legislative authority for the Industrial Personnel Security Program and
found such authority to be lacking. Although this comment did not
cover that phase of the Greene case,3 the opinion was significant in
certain other respects which are pertinent to the comment. While the
Court purported to refrain from touching upon other issues in the
case,4 their views on these issues were made quite plain, and the
language of the opinion in relation thereto was broad.
In reference to the specific context of this comment, the Court
stated that the right to hold specific private employment free from
unreasonable governmental interference did come within the liberty
and property concepts of the fifth amendment,5 and, moreover, that
Greene did suffer substantial injuries sufficient to give him standing
to sue.( Mr. Justice Harlan, in his special concurring opinion, casti-
gates Mr. Justice Clark, who dissented, for yielding "to the tempta-
tions of colorful characterization" in suggesting that the issue in the
case was "whether a citizen has a 'constitutional right to have access
to Government's military secrets.'-7 While it is true that the issue
cannot be stated so simply, Justice Clark is correct in saying that this
issue must be answered in order to reach either the authorization of
21d. at 508. Chief Justice Warren wrote the majority opinion for the Court.
3See note 5 supra. The following statement from the Court's opinion is signif-
icant. "The issue, as we see it, is whether the Department of Defense has been
authorized to create an industrial security clearance program...." 360 U.S. at
493. But see the view of Justice Clark in his dissent on this point: "Thus we see
that the program has for 18 years been carried on under the express authority of
the President, and has been regularly reported to him by his highest Cabinet
officers. How the Court can say, despite these facts, that the President has not
sufficiently authorized the program is beyond me, unless the Court means that it
is necessary for the President to write out the Industrial Security Manual in his
own hand." 36o US. at 521. (dissenting opinion).
'36o U.S. at 493.
r1d. at 492 (dictum).
"Id. at 493, n.22.
71d. at 510. (concurring specially). Cf. the language of Justice Clark: "Surely
one does not have a constitutional right to have access to the Government's mili-
tary secrets.... [And the Court] has in some unaccountable fashion parlayed his
[Green's] employment with ERCO into 'a constitutional right.' What for anyone
else would be considered a privilege at best has for Greene been enshrouded in
Constitutional protection." Id. at 511- (dissenting opinion).
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